Files
hive/core/framework/graph/code_sandbox.py
T
2026-01-27 10:45:49 -08:00

414 lines
11 KiB
Python

"""
Code Sandbox for Safe Execution of Dynamic Code.
Provides a restricted execution environment for code generated by
the external planner. This is critical for open-ended planning where
the planner can create arbitrary code actions.
Security measures:
1. Restricted builtins (no file I/O, no imports of dangerous modules)
2. Timeout enforcement
3. Memory limits (via resource module on Unix)
4. Namespace isolation
"""
import ast
import signal
import sys
from contextlib import contextmanager
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import Any
# Safe builtins whitelist
SAFE_BUILTINS = {
# Basic types
"True": True,
"False": False,
"None": None,
# Type constructors
"bool": bool,
"int": int,
"float": float,
"str": str,
"list": list,
"dict": dict,
"set": set,
"tuple": tuple,
"frozenset": frozenset,
# Basic functions
"abs": abs,
"all": all,
"any": any,
"bin": bin,
"chr": chr,
"divmod": divmod,
"enumerate": enumerate,
"filter": filter,
"format": format,
"hex": hex,
"isinstance": isinstance,
"issubclass": issubclass,
"iter": iter,
"len": len,
"map": map,
"max": max,
"min": min,
"next": next,
"oct": oct,
"ord": ord,
"pow": pow,
"range": range,
"repr": repr,
"reversed": reversed,
"round": round,
"slice": slice,
"sorted": sorted,
"sum": sum,
"zip": zip,
}
# Modules that can be imported
ALLOWED_MODULES = {
"math",
"json",
"re",
"datetime",
"collections",
"itertools",
"functools",
"operator",
"string",
"random",
"statistics",
"decimal",
"fractions",
}
# Dangerous AST nodes to block
BLOCKED_AST_NODES = {
ast.Import,
ast.ImportFrom,
ast.Global,
ast.Nonlocal,
}
class CodeSandboxError(Exception):
"""Error during sandboxed code execution."""
pass
class TimeoutError(CodeSandboxError):
"""Code execution timed out."""
pass
class SecurityError(CodeSandboxError):
"""Code contains potentially dangerous operations."""
pass
@dataclass
class SandboxResult:
"""Result of sandboxed code execution."""
success: bool
result: Any = None
error: str | None = None
stdout: str = ""
variables: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
execution_time_ms: int = 0
class RestrictedImporter:
"""Custom importer that only allows whitelisted modules."""
def __init__(self, allowed_modules: set[str]):
self.allowed_modules = allowed_modules
self._cache: dict[str, Any] = {}
def __call__(self, name: str, *args, **kwargs):
if name not in self.allowed_modules:
raise SecurityError(f"Import of module '{name}' is not allowed")
if name not in self._cache:
import importlib
self._cache[name] = importlib.import_module(name)
return self._cache[name]
class CodeValidator:
"""Validates code for safety before execution."""
def __init__(self, blocked_nodes: set[type] | None = None):
self.blocked_nodes = blocked_nodes or BLOCKED_AST_NODES
def validate(self, code: str) -> list[str]:
"""
Validate code and return list of issues.
Returns empty list if code is safe.
"""
issues = []
try:
tree = ast.parse(code)
except SyntaxError as e:
return [f"Syntax error: {e}"]
for node in ast.walk(tree):
# Check for blocked node types
if type(node) in self.blocked_nodes:
lineno = getattr(node, "lineno", "?")
issues.append(f"Blocked operation: {type(node).__name__} at line {lineno}")
# Check for dangerous attribute access
if isinstance(node, ast.Attribute):
if node.attr.startswith("_"):
issues.append(
f"Access to private attribute '{node.attr}' at line {node.lineno}"
)
# Check for exec/eval calls
if isinstance(node, ast.Call):
if isinstance(node.func, ast.Name):
if node.func.id in ("exec", "eval", "compile", "__import__"):
issues.append(
f"Blocked function call: {node.func.id} at line {node.lineno}"
)
return issues
class CodeSandbox:
"""
Sandboxed environment for executing dynamic code.
Usage:
sandbox = CodeSandbox(timeout_seconds=5)
result = sandbox.execute(
code="x = 1 + 2\\nresult = x * 3",
inputs={"multiplier": 2},
)
if result.success:
print(result.variables["result"]) # 6
"""
def __init__(
self,
timeout_seconds: int = 10,
allowed_modules: set[str] | None = None,
safe_builtins: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
):
self.timeout_seconds = timeout_seconds
self.allowed_modules = allowed_modules or ALLOWED_MODULES
self.safe_builtins = safe_builtins or SAFE_BUILTINS
self.validator = CodeValidator()
self.importer = RestrictedImporter(self.allowed_modules)
@contextmanager
def _timeout_context(self, seconds: int):
"""Context manager for timeout enforcement."""
def handler(signum, frame):
raise TimeoutError(f"Code execution timed out after {seconds} seconds")
# Only works on Unix-like systems
if hasattr(signal, "SIGALRM"):
old_handler = signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, handler)
signal.alarm(seconds)
try:
yield
finally:
signal.alarm(0)
signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, old_handler)
else:
# Windows: no timeout support, just execute
yield
def _create_namespace(self, inputs: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Create isolated namespace for code execution."""
namespace = {
"__builtins__": dict(self.safe_builtins),
"__import__": self.importer,
}
# Add input variables
namespace.update(inputs)
return namespace
def execute(
self,
code: str,
inputs: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
extract_vars: list[str] | None = None,
) -> SandboxResult:
"""
Execute code in sandbox.
Args:
code: Python code to execute
inputs: Variables to inject into namespace
extract_vars: Variable names to extract from namespace after execution
Returns:
SandboxResult with execution outcome
"""
import time
inputs = inputs or {}
extract_vars = extract_vars or []
# Validate code first
issues = self.validator.validate(code)
if issues:
return SandboxResult(
success=False,
error=f"Code validation failed: {'; '.join(issues)}",
)
# Create isolated namespace
namespace = self._create_namespace(inputs)
# Capture stdout
import io
old_stdout = sys.stdout
sys.stdout = captured_stdout = io.StringIO()
start_time = time.time()
try:
with self._timeout_context(self.timeout_seconds):
# Compile and execute
compiled = compile(code, "<sandbox>", "exec")
exec(compiled, namespace)
execution_time_ms = int((time.time() - start_time) * 1000)
# Extract requested variables
extracted = {}
for var in extract_vars:
if var in namespace:
extracted[var] = namespace[var]
# Also extract any new variables (not in inputs or builtins)
for key, value in namespace.items():
if key not in inputs and key not in self.safe_builtins and not key.startswith("_"):
extracted[key] = value
return SandboxResult(
success=True,
result=namespace.get("result"), # Convention: 'result' is the return value
stdout=captured_stdout.getvalue(),
variables=extracted,
execution_time_ms=execution_time_ms,
)
except TimeoutError as e:
return SandboxResult(
success=False,
error=str(e),
execution_time_ms=self.timeout_seconds * 1000,
)
except SecurityError as e:
return SandboxResult(
success=False,
error=f"Security violation: {e}",
execution_time_ms=int((time.time() - start_time) * 1000),
)
except Exception as e:
return SandboxResult(
success=False,
error=f"{type(e).__name__}: {e}",
stdout=captured_stdout.getvalue(),
execution_time_ms=int((time.time() - start_time) * 1000),
)
finally:
sys.stdout = old_stdout
def execute_expression(
self,
expression: str,
inputs: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
) -> SandboxResult:
"""
Execute a single expression and return its value.
Simpler than execute() - just evaluates one expression.
"""
inputs = inputs or {}
# Validate
try:
ast.parse(expression, mode="eval")
except SyntaxError as e:
return SandboxResult(success=False, error=f"Syntax error: {e}")
namespace = self._create_namespace(inputs)
try:
with self._timeout_context(self.timeout_seconds):
result = eval(expression, namespace)
return SandboxResult(success=True, result=result)
except Exception as e:
return SandboxResult(
success=False,
error=f"{type(e).__name__}: {e}",
)
# Singleton instance with default settings
default_sandbox = CodeSandbox()
def safe_exec(
code: str,
inputs: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
timeout_seconds: int = 10,
) -> SandboxResult:
"""
Convenience function for safe code execution.
Args:
code: Python code to execute
inputs: Variables to inject
timeout_seconds: Max execution time
Returns:
SandboxResult
"""
sandbox = CodeSandbox(timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds)
return sandbox.execute(code, inputs)
def safe_eval(
expression: str,
inputs: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
timeout_seconds: int = 5,
) -> SandboxResult:
"""
Convenience function for safe expression evaluation.
Args:
expression: Python expression to evaluate
inputs: Variables to inject
timeout_seconds: Max execution time
Returns:
SandboxResult
"""
sandbox = CodeSandbox(timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds)
return sandbox.execute_expression(expression, inputs)